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Abstract—Potential vulnerabilities in a power grid can be
exposed by identifying those transmission lines on which attacks
(in the form of interference with their transmission capabilities)
causes maximum disruption to the grid. In this study, we
model the grid by (nonlinear) AC power flow equations, and
assume that attacks take the form of increased impedance along
transmission lines. We quantify disruption in several different
ways, including (a) overall deviation of the voltages at the
buses from 1.0 per unit (p.u.), and (b) the minimal amount of
load that must be shed in order to restore the grid to stable
operation. We describe optimization formulations of the problem
of finding the most disruptive attack, which are either nonlinear
programing problems or nonlinear bilevel optimization problems,
and describe customized algorithms for solving these problems.
Experimental results on the IEEE 118-Bus system and a Polish
2383-Bus system are presented.
Index Terms—AC power flow equations, vulnerability analysis,
transmission line attack, bilevel optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
Identifying the vulnerable components in a power grid is
vital to the design and operation of a secure, stable system.
One aspect of vulnerability analysis is to identify those trans-
mission lines for which minor perturbations in their conductive
properties leads to major disruptions to the grid, such as
voltage drops, or the need for load shedding at demand nodes
to restore feasible operation.
Vulnerability assessment for power systems has been widely
studied in recent times. Most works focus on minimizing
the costs of load shedding and additional generation in the
DC model (which is relatively easy to solve) or in lossless
AC models (still relatively easy to solve and analyze). In
[1], [2], [3], identification of critical components of a power
system is formulated in a mixed-integer bilevel programming
framework, and attacks on different types of system compo-
nents (transmission lines, generators, and transformers) are
considered. The lower-level problem in the bilevel formulation
is replaced by its dual in [2] and is approximated using KKT
conditions in [3]. As an extension of [1], an approach based on
Bender’s decomposition is proposed to solve larger instances
of the transmission line attack problem in [4].
Vulnerability assessment using the lossless AC model is
studied in [5], [6]. In these papers, transmission-line attacks
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are formulated as bilevel optimization problems, in which
either unmet demands are maximized or attack costs (number
of lines to attack) are minimized to meet a specified level of
grid disruption. (These models are also discussed in [7], which
describes the equivalence of the two models.) Then the lower-
level problem is replaced by its KKT conditions, yielding the
single-level optimization problem that is actually solved. In
[5], this mixed-integer problem is relaxed to a continuous
problem (the binary variables are relaxed to real variables
confined to the interval [0, 1]), while [6] develops a graph-
partitioning approach by identifying load-rich and generation-
rich regions.
The paper [8] describes a model that uses both load shed-
ding and line switching as defensive operations to reduce the
disruption of the system; the model is solved via Bender’s
decomposition with a restart framework. Use of a genetic
algorithm to solve the “N−k” problem (identifying the set of
k lines in a grid of N lines whose removal causes maximum
disruption) is discussed in [9]. A minimum-cardinality ap-
proach (solved using a cutting-plane method) and a continuous
nonlinear attack model employing the DC power flow to
represent power grids, where a fictitious adversary modifies
reactances, are applied to the “N − k” problem in [10].
In this paper, we propose two optimization models for
vulnerability analysis. Both models are founded on the AC
power flow equations, and both consider attacks in which
the impedances of transmission lines are increased. In both
formulations, the attacks respect a certain “budget;” their total
amount of impedance adjustment cannot exceed a certain spec-
ified level. The goal of the attacks is to maximize disruption,
as measured by two different metrics.
The first metric quantifies voltage disturbance at the buses,
leading to a nonlinear programming formulation. The voltage
disturbance usually appears as voltage drop, which often leads
to an undesirable situation where voltages become low enough
that the system cannot maintain stability. This situation, which
is called voltage collapse or voltage instability, can happen
either quickly or relatively slowly, and is characterized by a
parallel process where reactive power demand correspondingly
increases. This eventuality causes the active-power behavior
of the system to approach the ”nose” of the P − V curve. A
more complete description is provided in [11, pages 31 and
35]. With our first metric, we estimate this possible voltage
instability of a power grid assuming there is no response from
a system operator to the attack.
The second metric we consider here is a weighted sum of
the amount of load shedding (at demand nodes) and generation
reduction (at generation nodes) that is required to restore
feasible operation of the grid following the attack. This power
adjustment is considered as a defensive action of a system
operator to keep voltages within a stable range to avoid
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2voltage collapse. This case is modeled as a bilevel optimization
problem, in which the lower level finds the minimum load
adjustment required to respond to the attack, and the upper-
level problem is to find the most disruptive attack.
In some existing literature, including some of the papers
cited above, a bilevel optimization model is reformulated as a
single-level optimization problem by replacing the lower level
problem by its optimality conditions. This formulation strategy
is unappealing, as the optimality conditions characterize only
a stationary point, rather than a minimizer, so they may
allow consideration of saddle points or local maximizers. In
addition, if the bilevel formulation is designed to solve the
attacker-defender framework that we consider in this paper,
the reformulated single-level optimization model constructed
by replacing the lower-level problem by primal-dual optimality
conditions has the serious flaw that the model may exclude the
most effective attack. Specifically, an attack (upper level deci-
sion) that leads to an infeasible lower level problem obviously
maximizes the disruption and thus is “optimal” for the attack
problem (since it is not possible to make a operational decision
at the lower level to defend against the attack). However,
such an attack is excluded from consideration by the single-
level reformulation since no (lower-level) primal-dual point
satisfies the optimality condition constraints under the attack.
Thus, the single-level formulation will ignore the most critical
attack. Another drawback of single-level reformulations is
that the optimality-condition constraints may violate constraint
qualifications, causing possible complications in convergence
behavior.
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as
follows:
1) In contrast to previous attack models, the grid is modeled
with full AC power flow equations, which are the most
accurate mathematical models of power flow.
2) In our bilevel optimization formulation, we actually
solve the lower-level problem rather than replacing it
by its optimality conditions, as is done in earlier works,
to avoid the formulation defects discussed above.
3) We develop effective heuristics that make our formula-
tions tractable even for power grids with thousands of
buses.
The remaining sections are organized as follows. We de-
velop the optimization models in Section II and describe
the challenges to be addressed in solving them. Section III
describes heuristics and optimization techniques that address
these challenges and that yield solutions of the problems.
Experimental results on 118-Bus and 2383-Bus cases are pre-
sented in Section IV, and we discuss conclusions in Section V.
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
In this section we discuss power systems background and
notation, and describe our two formulations of the vulnera-
bility analysis problem. We describe notation and background
on power flow equations in Subsection II-A. Our first vul-
nerability model, based on a voltage disturbance objective, is
discussed in Subsection II-B. The second model, based on a
power-adjustment criterion, is discussed in Subsection II-C.
A. Notations and Background
We summarize here the power systems notation used in later
sections, most of which is standard.
• Set of buses: N
• Set of generators: G ⊆ N
• Set of demand buses: D ⊆ N
• Index of the slack bus: s ∈ N
• Set of transmission lines: L ⊆ N ×N
• Unit imaginary number: j =
√−1
• Complex power at bus i ∈ N : Pi + jQi (active power: Pi;
real power: Qi)
• Complex voltage at bus i ∈ N : Viejθi (voltage magnitude:
Vi; phase angle: θi)
• Difference of angles θi and θi′ , for (i, i′) ∈ L: θii′ :=
θi − θi′
• (i, i′) entry of the admittance matrix for the (unperturbed)
grid: Gii′ + jBii′ (conductance: Gii′ ; susceptance: Bii′ ).
We assume that the set of generators G and the set of demand
buses D form a partition of N .
An attack on the grid is specified by means of a line
perturbation vector: γ ∈ R|L|+ , with γii′ denoting the relative
increase in impedance on line (i, i′) ∈ L. Specifically, an
attack designated by the vector γ causes conductances and
susceptances to be modified as follows:
Gii′(γ) =

Gii′
γii′ + 1
if i 6= i′,
−
∑
i 6=m
Gim(γ) if i = i′,
Bii′(γ) =

Bii′
γii′ + 1
if i 6= i′,
−
∑
i 6=m
(
Bim(γ)− 1
2
Bshim
)
if i = i′,
where Bshim is the shunt (line charging) admittance of line
(i,m) ∈ L. More details on the bus admittance matrix can
be found from [12, Chapter 9]. Note that when γii′ = 0 for
all (i, i′) ∈ L, the conductances and susceptances all attain
their original (unperturbed) values.
The AC power flow equations with perturbations γ can be
written as follows: [
FP (V, θ; γ)
FQ(V, θ; γ)
]
= 0, (1)
where the entries of FP and FQ (for all i ∈ N ) are defined
as follows, for all i ∈ N :
FPi (V, θ; γ) :=
Vi
∑
i′:(i,i′)∈L
Vi′(Gii′(γ) cos θii′ +Bii′(γ) sin θii′)− Pi, (2a)
FQi (V, θ; γ) :=
Vi
∑
i′:(i,i′)∈L
Vi′(Gii′(γ) sin θii′ −Bii′(γ) cos θii′)−Qi. (2b)
We assume throughout the paper that Pi > 0 for generator
buses i ∈ G and Pi < 0 and Qi < 0 for demand buses
i ∈ D. The power flow problem is to find the values of
3the vectors V , θ, P , and Q that satisfy equations (2), given
the load demands PD and QD at load buses and the voltage
magnitudes VG and active power injection PG at the generator
buses. Conventionally, the reactive powers QG are eliminated
from the problem (since they can be obtained explicitly from
(2b) for i ∈ G, and appear in no other equations), yielding the
following reduced formulation:
F (V, θ; γ) =
FPG (V, θ; γ)FPD (V, θ; γ)
FQD (V, θ; γ)
 = 0. (3)
Here, Vs, θs, VG , PG , PD, and QD are parameters associated
with the network; γ is the impedance modification vector
described above; and VD and θG∪D are the variables in the
model. These equations usually can be solved using Newton’s
method, when the system has a solution. For additional details
of formulation of power flow problems, see [12, Chapter 10].
B. Voltage Disturbance Model
The AC power flow problem (3) often has multiple solutions
[13], but only those solutions with Vi ≈ 1.0 per unit (p.u.)
for all i ∈ D are stable and operational in practice. In the
vulnerability model described in this subsection, we use the
sum-of-squares deviation FV of the voltages from 1.0 p.u. as
a measure of the disruption caused by an attack:
FV (γ) :=

1
2
∑
i∈D
(Vi − 1)2 where V is obtained bysolving F (V, θ; γ) = 0,
+∞ when F (V, θ; γ) = 0 has
no solution.
(4)
Here, FV is a function of γ, the vector of relative impedance
increases. Note that only the voltage magnitudes of demand
buses D are considered in FV (γ), since the voltage magni-
tudes for generators and slack bus are given and fixed. We set
FV (γ) = +∞ when the attack results in an infeasible grid,
since such attacks are the best possible.
To limit the power of the purported attacker, we impose a
constraint on the vector γ, and define the voltage disturbance
vulnerability problem as follows:
HV (κ, γ) := max
γ
FV (γ) (5a)
subject to eT γ ≤ κγ (5b)
0 ≤ γ ≤ γe, (5c)
where e = (1, 1, . . . , 1)T , the scalar γ is an upper bound
on relative impedance perturbation for each line, and κ is
the maximum number of lines that can be attacked at the
maximum level. (Note that the actual number of lines attacked
may be greater than κ if non-maximal attacks are made on
some lines.)
Note that although the following model is a plausible
alternative to (5), it is actually not valid:
max
VD,θD∪G ,γ
1
2
∑
i∈D
(Vi − 1)2 (6a)
subject to F (V, θ; γ) = 0 (6b)
eT γ ≤ κγ (6c)
0 ≤ γ ≤ γe. (6d)
The reason is that when there is an attack γ satisfying (5b)
and (5c) that results in an infeasible grid, the formulation (5)
will find it (with an objective function of +∞) while the
formulation (6) will not. In other words, the formulation (6)
does not fully capture the adversarial nature of the attack.
However, as a practical matter, these two formulations find the
same solution in cases where every γ satisfying (5b) and (5c)
allows for a feasible solution of the AC power flow equations.
C. Power-Adjustment Model
Our second way to measure severity of an attack is to
consider the minimum adjustments to power that must be made
to restore the grid to feasible operation. Power adjustments
take the form of shedding load at demand nodes and adjusting
generation at generator nodes. (We use weights in the objective
to discourage adjustment on nodes where it is undesirable,
such as at generators whose output cannot be adjusted or
at critical demand nodes whose load cannot be changed.)
Calculation of this weighted sum of power adjustments in-
volves solving a nonlinear programming problem that we call
the feasibility restoration problem. This problem forms the
lower-level problem in the bilevel optimization problem, as
we outline at the end of this subsection.
1) Feasibility Restoration: When the attack represented
by γ is too severe, the AC power flow equations (3) may
not have a solution for which the voltages lie within an
acceptable range. The feasibility restoration problem finds
minimal adjustments to the power demands (at demand nodes
D) and power generation (at generator nodes G) for which
feasibility is restored to the AC power flow equations. The
formulation is as follows:
FL(γ) := min
VD,θD∪G ,
σ+G ,σ
−
G ,ρD
∑
i∈G
ωi|Pi|(σ+i + σ−i ) +
∑
i∈D
ωi|Pi|ρi (7a)
subject to FPG (V, θ; γ)− |PG |  (σ+G − σ−G ) = 0 (7b)
FPD (V, θ; γ)− |PD|  ρD = 0 (7c)
FQD (V, θ; γ)− |QD|  ρD = 0 (7d)
V ≤ VD ≤ V (7e)
0 ≤ σ+G ≤ σ+G (7f)
0 ≤ σ−G ≤ σ−G (7g)
0 ≤ ρD ≤ ρD, (7h)
where a b is element-wise multiplication of vectors a and b.
Here, the variables σ+, σ−, and ρ represent relative changes in
demand loads and power generation, so that constraints (7b),
(7c), and (7d) represent power flow equations (3) in which the
loads PG , PD, and QD are modified. The parameters ωi repre-
sent positive weights on the changes to loads and generation,
indicating the desirability or undesirability of changes to that
node. We note the following points.
• The same variable ρi is used in the active and reactive
power balance equations (7c) and (7d), since active and
reactive load shedding should occur in the same fraction.
• Bound constraints (7f), (7g), and (7h) on the load shed-
ding variables limit the adjustments to a reasonable range
(which may be zero for some buses).
4• The weights ωi could be set to large positive values to
discourage changes on that node, and to smaller values
when change is acceptable. The case in which no change
at all is allowable on that node can be handled by setting
the upper bound to zero in (7f), (7g), or (7h). Throughout
the paper, we assume that ωi = 1 for all i, but note that
other positive values of these weights can be used without
any complication to the model.
• Power generation at the generator nodes may be either
increased or decreased in general, but the loads at demand
nodes can only decrease. (Upper bounds σ+i , σ
−
i , and ρi
should not exceed 1. This means that the type of a bus
— generator or demand bus — cannot be changed.)
• The bounds (7e) guarantee that voltage levels are opera-
tionally viable.
The objective to be minimized in (7) is the weighted sum of
power adjustments that are necessary to restore feasibility to
the power flow equations. We define FL(γ) = +∞ when it
is not possible to restore feasibility by adjusting loads and
generations (which usually happens because the constraints
regarding acceptable voltage levels (7e) cannot be satisfied
even when load shedding is allowed).
The feasibility restoration problem (7) is a nonconvex
smooth constrained optimization problem in general, so we
can expect to find only a local solution when using standard
algorithms for such problems. The problem generalizes (3) in
that if a solution of the latter problem exists, it will yield a
global solution of (7) with an objective of zero when we set
σ+i = σ
−
i = 0 for i ∈ G and ρi = 0 for i ∈ D, provided the
voltage constraints (7e) are satisfied. Moreover, by the well-
known sparsity property induced by `1 objectives, we expect
few of the components of σ+G , σ
−
G , and ρD to be nonzero
at a typical solution of (7). The problem (7) may also have
operational relevance, guiding the grid operator toward a set
of decisions that can restore stable operation of the grid with
minimal disruption.
For convenience of later discussion, we state (7) in the
following more compact form:
FL(γ) := min
x,y
pT y (8a)
subject to FL(x, y; γ) = 0 (8b)
x ≤ x ≤ x (8c)
0 ≤ y ≤ y, (8d)
where FL(x, y; γ) = 0 represents the equality constraints (7b)-
(7d), x includes the circuit variables V and θ, and y includes
the power-adjustment variables σ+, σ−, and ρ.
2) Bilevel Formulation: The bilevel optimization formu-
lation seeks the attack γ for which the power-adjustment
objective FL is maximized subject to the same attack budget
constraints as in (5), that is,
HL(κ, γ) := max
γ
FL(γ) (9a)
subject to eT γ ≤ κγ (9b)
0 ≤ γ ≤ γe. (9c)
By substituting from (8), we obtain a max-min problem:
HL(κ, γ) := max
γ
min
x,y
pT y (10a)
subject to FL(x, y; γ) = 0 (10b)
x ≤ x ≤ x (10c)
0 ≤ y ≤ y (10d)
eT γ ≤ κγ (10e)
0 ≤ γ ≤ γe. (10f)
Bilevel optimization problems are, in general, difficult to
solve. For problems of the form (10), it is possible for the
upper-level objective FL to change discontinuously at some
values of γ, even when the constraint function FL is smooth
and nonlinear.
For the power-adjustment formulation, there is an additional
complication: For most feasible values of γ, the objective
function is zero. This is because power grids are often robust
to small perturbations, so when even when many impedances
change, it is often possible to continue meeting all demands
while respecting operational limits on the voltage values. This
feature makes it difficult to search for the optimal γ, since
it is difficult even to find a starting value of γ that causes
nonzero disruption. We have developed specialized heuristics
to address this issue; these are described in Section III-C.
III. ALGORITHM DESCRIPTION
We discuss a first-order method for the following formula-
tion, which generalizes (5) and (9):
H(κ, γ) := max
γ
F(γ) (11a)
subject to eT γ ≤ κγ (11b)
0 ≤ γ ≤ γe. (11c)
Although the objective F is not convex or smooth, we solve
it with the classical Frank-Wolfe method (also known as the
conditional gradient method), which we describe in the next
subsection.
A. Frank-Wolfe Algorithm
The Frank-Wolfe algorithm [14] solves a sequence of sub-
problems in which a first-order approximation to the objective
around the current iterate is minimized over the given feasible
set. If the objective F in (11) were smooth, we would solve
the following problem at the kth iterate γk:
wk := argmax
w
(gk)T (w − γk)
subject to eTw ≤ κγ, 0 ≤ w ≤ γ,
(12)
where gk is a gradient F(γ) at γk. The new iterate is obtained
by setting
γk+1 = γk + αk(w
k − γk),
for some αk ∈ (0, 1]. (Frank and Wolfe [14] give a specific
formula for αk that guarantees a sublinear convergence rate for
smooth convex F . An exact line search would yield a similar
rate.) Because of the special nature of our constraint set, the
5problem (12) is a linear program with a closed-form solution,
whose components wki are defined as follows:
wki =
{
γ if gki is one of κ largest entries in g
k,
0 otherwise.
(13)
We determine the step size αk by a standard backtracking
procedure. Given a constant φ ∈ (0, 1), and starting from α =
1, we decrease the step size by α ← φα until the following
sufficient decrease condition is satisfied for a small c1 ∈ (0, 1).
F(γk + α(wk − γk)) ≥ F(γk) + c1αgkT (wk − γk). (14)
We define αk to be the value of α accepted by this criterion.
The algorithmic framework is shown in Algorithm 1. We
terminate when the step (wk − γk) becomes small, or when
the step size α becomes less than a predefined αmin > 0.
Convergence behavior of the Frank-Wolfe procedure with
backtracking line search for the smooth nonconvex case has
been analyzed by Dunn [15, Theorem 4.1], where it is shown
that accumulation points are stationary. (This result does not
apply directly to our cases, because of potential nonsmooth-
ness of the objectives.)
Algorithm 1 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS
Require:
γ: Upper bound for impedance increases γi, i ∈ L;
κ: Number of lines to attack;
γ0: Feasible initial value of γ;
Ensure:
γ∗: Impedance vector that optimizes the attack;
1: k ← 0;
2: while k ≤MAXITER do
3: Find the gradient gk of the objective F at γk;
4: Find linearized optimum wk from (13);
5: Use the backtracking to find step size αk ∈ [0, 1];
6: γk+1 ← γk + αk(wk − γk);
7: k ← k + 1;
8: Stop if termination conditions are satisfied, and set γ∗ ← γk;
9: end while
B. Gradient Calculation
Algorithm 1 requires calculation of a gradient gk of the
objective function F at the current iterate γk. We have noted
already that the power-adjustment objective F = FL may be
nonsmooth, due to changes in the active set of the subproblem
(8), so the gradient may not be well defined. We note however
that FL can reasonably be assumed to be smooth almost
everywhere; changes to the active set can be expected to
happen only on a set of measure zero in the feasible space
for γ. Our algorithm does not appear to encounter values of
γ where FL is nondifferentiable in practice.
We outline a scheme for calculating gradients of FV and
FL in Appendix A. The technique is essentially to use the
implicit function theorem to find sensitivities of the variables
in the problems that define FV and FL to the parameters
γ, around the current solution of these problems, and then
proceed to find the sensitivities of the optimal objective value
for these problems to γ.
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Fig. 1. Power adjustment as a result of changes to line impedances on the
30-Bus data set. It is often the case that load shedding is not required even
when the disturbance to the system is quite substantial.
C. Power-Adjustment Model Initialization
As mentioned above, the objective value of the bilevel
formulation is zero for most feasible values of γ. It tends
to be nonzero only on parts of the feasible region defined by
(11b), (11c) that correspond to near-maximal attacks focused
on small numbers of buses.
To illustrate this point, we perform experiments on the 30-
Bus case (case30.m from MATPOWER, originally from [16])
in which we monitor the power-adjustment objective FL(γ)
in (7) as the impedances are increased. In Figure 1(a), we plot
FL(γ) in for the values γ = γˆe, where γˆ is a nonnegative
scalar parameter that is increased progressively from 0 to 1.
That is, impedances are increase evenly across all transmission
lines. Note that FL(γˆe) is zero for γˆ ∈ [0, 0.65], while for
γˆ > 0.65, load shedding occurs on one or two demand buses.
This observation implies that any value γ along the line γˆe (for
γˆ ∈ [0, .65]) is a global minimizer of the bilevel problem (9).
The gradient is zero at each of these points, so optimization
methods that construct the search direction from gradients
cannot make progress if started anywhere along this line (or
indeed from anywhere in a large neighborhood of this line).
6If we are allowed to distribute a “budget” of impedance
increases unequally between lines, so as to minimize the total
amount of power adjustment required, even greater distur-
bances can be tolerated. To describe this greater tolerance, we
consider the following problem that is sliglty modified from
(10):
HS(κ, γ) := min
x,y,γ
pT y (15a)
subject to FL(x, y; γ) = 0 (15b)
x ≤ x ≤ x (15c)
0 ≤ y ≤ y (15d)
eT γ = κγ (15e)
0 ≤ γ ≤ γe. (15f)
Note that (15) is different from (9) in two respects: (a) it
is a single-level minimization problem whose variables are
x, y, and γ; and (b) the budget is enforced with the equality
constraint (15e). Thus this problem finds a “safe” way to
distribute the fixed budget (κγ) to transmission lines while
the total load-shedding pT y is minimized. We solved this
problem for an upper bound γ = 3 with κ, which is increased
progressively from 1 to 41. The top chart in Figure 1(b) shows
that it is possible to increase κ to about 33 before any load
shedding takes place at all. The lower chart depicts how the
impedance changes are distributed around the 41 lines in the
grid, at the solution of (15), for each value of κ. Darker bars
on the graph show lines that can tolerate only a relatively
small increase in impedance before causing load shedding
somewhere in the grid. The lighter bars are those that can
tolerate their impedance value γi being set to a value at or
near the upper bound 3 without affecting load shedding. As
an example: When κ = 40, we have HS(40, 3) ≈ 55, and the
γ that achieves this power-adjustment value has components
of 3 on all lines except line 16, where it is zero.
The methodology used to derive Figure 1(b) can be used
as a heuristic to identify a set of “safe” lines S (whose
impedances can be increased without affecting grid perfor-
mance) and a complementary set of “vulnerable” lines W
(for which impedance increases are likely to lead to load
shedding). In Appendix B, we describe the ESL (“estimating
safe lines”) procedure, Algorithm 3, for determining the sets S
and W . Once we have determined the vulnerable lines W , we
define an impedance perturbation vector γ′ with the following
components:
γ′i =
{
γ i ∈ W
0 i /∈ W, (16)
where γ is the given upper bound on impedance on a given
line. We then evaluate FL(γ′) from (7). If a node does not
require any load shedding under this maximal-perturbation
setting, it is unlikely that any attack on the vulnerable lines
will lead to load shedding on this node. We gather the other
nodes — those for which ρi > 0 at the solution of (7h) with
γ = γ′ — into a set T , the “target nodes.” Further explanation
of the definition of T is given in Appendix B2.
We use the target nodes to define a modification of the
objective FL that has the effect of shifting the range of the
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Fig. 2. Extending the range of FL(γ) by allowing additional load on
demand nodes. Adding load to target nodes (top figure) produces a useful
extension of the range of the objective, so that its gradient yields a promising
search direction for the maximization problem. Adding load to non-target
nodes (bottom figure) simply shifts the objective down by a constant, so that
the gradient in the flat region still does not yield a useful search direction for
the maximization problem.
function, in a way that makes gradient information relevant
even at values of γ for which no power adjustments are
required. The idea is illustrated in Figure 2, where we show the
power-adjustment requirement on two different nodes (nodes
8 and 20) of the 30-Bus system as a function of the values of
two impedance parameters — those corresponding to lines 10
and 40. In both graphs of Figure 2, the top surfaces (shaded
white and red) represent the objective FL as a function of
various values of the pair (γ10, γ40). Note that FL takes the
value zero over much of the domain, but becomes positive
when both γ10 and γ40 are high. The lower surfaces in each
graph show how FL changes when we modify the subproblem
in (7) by removing the zero lower lower bound on the load
ρi in (7h), where i = 8 (a target node) in Figure 2(a) and
i = 20 (a non-target node) in Figure 2(b). Removal of the
lower bound has the effect of allowing load to be added to
7Algorithm 2 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS: POWER-
ADJUSTMENT MODEL
Require:
γ: Upper bound for impedance increases γi, i ∈ L;
κ: Number of lines to attack;
γ0: Feasible initial value of γ;
Ensure:
γ∗: Impedance vector that optimizes the attack;
1: Find a set of vulnerable lines W and target nodes T using the ESL
procedure (Algorithm 3);
2: Set lower bound of ρi (for target nodes i ∈ T ) to −∞;
3: k ← 0;
4: while k ≤MAXITER do
5: Find gradient gk of FL at γk .
6: Find linearized optimum wk from (13);
7: Use the backtracking to find step size αk ∈ [0, 1];
8: γk+1 ← γk + αk(wk − γk);
9: Identify i such that ρi = argmin
j
ρj , where ρj are the
power-adjustment variables from (7);
10: if ρi < 0 then
11: reset lower bound on ρi to zero;
12: end if
13: k ← k + 1;
14: Stop if terminating conditions (including ρj ≥ 0 for all power-
adjustment variables ρj ) are satisfied;
15: end while
16: γ∗ ← γk;
the node in question. This is not an action that would be
operationally desirable, but as we see from the blue surface
in Figure 2(a), it changes the nature of FL in useful ways.
The effect of removing the lower bound on ρ8 (Figure 2(a))
is to extend the range of FL so that its derivative at any point
in the domain gives useful information about a good search
direction. In a sense, the extended-range version appears to be
a natural extension of the original objective FL. By contrast,
removal of the lower bound on ρ20 (Figure 2(b)) causes the
function to simply be shifted downward by a roughly constant
amount for all pairs of impedance perturbation values. This is
because, being a non-target node, increased load on this node
can be met, even after the grid is damaged by the impedance
attack. We conclude that removing lower bounds on ρi for
target nodes i ∈ T provides a potentially useful extension of
the range of the function FL, whereas the same cannot be said
for non-target nodes.
Motivated by these observations, we modify Algorithm 1
as follows. We start by removing all lower bounds in (7h) on
target nodes i ∈ T . At each iteration of the algorithm, after
taking a step, we check to see if any of the ρi obtained by
solving the subproblem (7) at the latest iteration are negative.
If so, we reset the lower bound on the most negative value of ρi
to zero, before moving on to the next iteration. The algorithm
does not terminate until all ρi are nonnegative. The modified
procedure is shown as Algorithm 2.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We present the results obtained with our formulations
and algorithms on the IEEE 118-Bus system and Polish
2383-Bus system. Our implementations use MATLAB1 with
1Version 8.1.0.604 (R2013a)
IPOPT2 (Wa¨chter and Biegler [17]) as the nonlinear solver for
evaluating FL (7) in the power-adjustment (bilevel) model.
For the test case data and calculation of the electric circuit
parameters, the codes from MATPOWER [18] are used exten-
sively. The codes were executed on a Macbook Pro (2 GHz
Intel Core i7 processor) with 8GB RAM.
TABLE I
TEST CASES FOR EXPERIMENTS
Test Cases
1 2 3 4
Filename (in MATPOWER) case118.m case2383wp.m
Number of Nodes 118 2383
Number of Lines 186 2896
Number of Lines to Attack κ 3 5 3 5
Perturbation Upper Bound γ 3 2
Backtracking Parameters (c0, c1, αmin) (0.5, 0.01, 0.01)
Voltage limits (V , V ) (0.93, 1.07) (0.89, 1.12)
Line Screening Threshold η 0.9
Information about the test case instances and algorithmic
parameters are given in Table I. There are two instances for
each of the two grids, corresponding to 3-line and 5-line
attacks, respectively. The table shows voltage magnitude limits
that are applied in the power-adjustment model, together with
the value of η that is used in the ESL procedure (Algorithm 3
from Appendix B1).
In the power-adjustment model (7), the upper bounds σ+i ,
σ−i , and ρi on the power-adjustment variables are set to 1 for
most buses, thus allowing full load shedding. If a bus violates
our assumption on power injection — that is, if Pi ≤ 0 for
bus i ∈ G or Pi ≥ 0 or Qi ≥ 0 for bus i ∈ D — the load-
shedding upper bound for that bus is set to 0, disallowing
power adjustment on that bus. The power-adjustment objective
FL is considered to be nonzero if it is at least 10−3 megawatt
(MW).
A. Voltage Disturbance Model
We discuss first results obtained with the voltage disturbance
model (4)-(5) applied to the four test cases of Table I.
118-Bus System: For a 3-line attack problem on IEEE 118-
Bus system (κ = 3), Algorithm 1 converges in 5 iterations and
identifies exactly three lines to attack with maximal impedance
increase: lines 71, 74, and 82 (as shown in Table II). As a
result of this attack, voltage magnitudes at four buses decrease
significantly, by up to 0.07 p.u., as shown in Figure 3. (In
Figure 3(a), the buses are reordered in increasing order of
voltage magnitude on the undisturbed system. In Figure 3(b),
the buses are indexed in their original order.) The attack is
visualized in Figure 5, where we see that its effect is essentially
to isolate buses 51, 52, 53, and 58; the attacked lines are
colored in red.
For the second test instance, on the IEEE 118-Bus system
with κ = 5, the algorithm identifies exactly five lines to attack
at the maximal impedance increase — lines 25, 29, 71, 74, and
82 (see Table III) — which includes the three lines identified
in the first attack. With this stronger attack, there is significant
2Version 3.11.7
8TABLE II
VOLTAGE DISTURBANCE MODEL: 118-BUS SYSTEM WITH κ = 3
Line Buses Continuous
No. From To Attack (γi)
71 49 51 3.00
74 53 54 3.00
82 56 58 3.00
Objective 4.04× 10−2
Optimal Attack (as determined by our algorithm)
20 40 60 80 100
0.9
1.0
1.1
Bus Index (reordered)
p.
u.
Voltage Magnitude
After Attack
Before Attack
(a) Distribution of Voltage Magnitudes Before and After Attack.
0 20 40 60 80 100
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0.00
Bus Index (original order)
p.
u.
Changes in Voltage Magnitude
(b) Distribution of Voltage Magnitudes Changes After Attack.
Fig. 3. Voltage Disturbance Model: 118-Bus System with κ = 3
voltage drop on seven buses. Algorithm 1 takes 8 iterations
to converge to the solution. As Figure 5 shows, attacking
the additional two lines (colored in green) has the effect of
creating another “island,” consisting of buses 20, 21 and 22.
The additional voltage drops seen Figure 4(b) are from these
buses.
2383-Bus System: Results for our third test instance in
Table I, which considers the 2383-Bus model with attack limit
defined by κ = 3, are shown in Table IV. The continuous
impedance attack is distributed into 5 lines, identified after
ten iterations of Algorithm 1. (The lines involved in the attack
are revealed at iteration five, while the remaining five iterations
make minor adjustments to the impedance values.)
This 5-line solution can be used to identify the most
disruptive set of three lines using two heuristics: (a) choose
the three lines i such that γi are one of the largest three entries
in γ (called the Top-3 attack); and (b) try all possible 3-line
combinations of the five lines with highest impedance (the
Best-3 attack). For this specific case, the Top-3 attack and
Best-3 attack are the same, consisting of lines 5, 405, and 467.
These 3-line attacks, with impedance set to their maximum
values on all three lines, gives a slightly smaller objective
value than the continuous attack.
TABLE III
VOLTAGE DISTURBANCE MODEL: 118-BUS SYSTEM WITH κ = 5
Line Buses Continuous
No. From To Attack (γi)
25 19 20 3.00
29 22 23 3.00
71 49 51 3.00
74 53 54 3.00
82 56 58 3.00
Objective 5.03× 10−2
Optimal Attack (as determined by our Algorithm)
20 40 60 80 100
0.9
1.0
1.1
Bus Index (reordered)
p.
u.
Voltage Magnitude
After Attack
Before Attack
(a) Distribution of Voltage Magnitude Before and After Attack.
0 20 40 60 80 100
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0.00
Bus Index (original order)
p.
u.
Changes in Voltage Magnitude
(b) Distribution of Voltage Magnitude Changes and After Attack.
Fig. 4. Voltage Disturbance Model: 118-Bus System with κ = 5
Figure 6(b) shows how the voltage magnitude changes when
the Best-3 and Top-3 attacks are executed. Similarly to 118-
Bus cases, there is a relatively small number of buses in which
the voltage drops significantly from its original value, but large
voltage changes are seen on some buses, with some voltage
magnitudes below 0.8 p.u.
For our fourth test instance in Table I, for which κ = 5
on the 2383-Bus system, two iterations of Algorithm 1 suffice
to identify an attack (on lines 404, 405, 467, 479, and 501)
that makes the power flow problem infeasible, that is, there
is no (V, θ) that satisfies F (V, θ; γ) = 0 under this attack.
Hence, unless the grid operator takes action (to change loads
or generator outputs, for example), an attack on these five lines
renders the grid inoperable.
Comparison with Continuous Optimization Model: In Sec-
tion II-B, we mentioned that the voltage disturbance model can
be written as a continuous optimization model (6), except that
the latter model does not handle infeasibility appropriately. We
verify the properties of this alternative formulation by solving
it with the nonlinear interior-point solver IPOPT. We find that
in the first three instances of Table I, the solutions obtained
9Fig. 5. Voltage Disturbance Model: Attacks on the 118-Bus System. The transmission lines in red are are the optimal attack for κ = 3. The lines in green
are added to the optimal 3-line attack when κ is increased to 5.
TABLE IV
VOLTAGE DISTURBANCE MODEL: 2383-BUS SYSTEM WITH κ = 3
Line Buses Continuous Top-3 Best-3
No. From To Attack (γi) Attack Attack
5 10 3 1.04 2.00 2.00
404 434 188 0.25
405 437 188 2.00 2.00 2.00
467 340 218 2.00 2.00 2.00
501 340 240 0.71
Objective 0.514 0.501 0.501
Optimal Attack (as determined by our Algorithm)
500 1,000 1,500 2,000
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
Bus Index (reordered)
p.
u.
Voltage Magnitude
After Attack
Before Attack
(a) Distribution of Voltage Magnitude Before and After Attack. (Best-3)
0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000
−0.15
−0.10
−0.05
0.00
Bus Index (original order)
p.
u.
Changes in Voltage Magnitude
(b) Distribution of Voltage Magnitude Changes After Attack. (Best-3)
Fig. 6. Voltage Disturbance Model: 2383-Bus System with κ = 3
from (5) match those we described above. In the fourth test
case — the 2383-Bus model with κ = 5 — the model (6)
identifies a solution that maximizes disruption subject to the
power flow equations (3) remaining feasible. Our model (5),
which detects infeasibility of the grid under an attack of this
strength, yields the more informative outcome.
B. Power-Adjustment Model
We now present results for the power-adjustment model (7),
(9), for the four test instances of Table I.
118-Bus System: The ESL procedure (Algorithm 3), which
is described in Section III-C and Appendix B1, is applied
to the 118-Bus system to identify vulnerable lines W =
{29, 71, 74, 96, 184} and target nodes T = {52, 53, 117}. We
use these settings of W and T in Algorithm 2 to solve the
first two instances in Table I.
For the first test case (κ = 3), Algorithm 2 terminates after
eight iterations, at the attack shown in Table V. Four lines
are involved in this attack; we reduce to three-line attacks
“Top-3” and “Best-3” as in Subsection IV-A. The Top-3 and
Best-3 attacks coincide (and are the same as those obtained for
the voltage disturbance model in Subsection IV-A) and have
a slightly smaller objective value than the continuous attack.
We note that in these 3-line attacks, the voltage magnitudes of
buses 52 and 53 are at their lower bound V = .93, and load
shedding is required for buses 51 and 53, the total amount of
load shedding being 22.13 MW.
In Table VI, we show the top five three-line attacks obtained
by enumerating all 266, 916 possible three-line attacks on this
grid. The most disruptive attack is indeed the one found by
our algorithm.
For the second test instance (with κ = 5), Algorithm 1
requires twelve iterations to converge, and distributes the
impedance increases around nine lines, with the maximum
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TABLE V
POWER-ADJUSTMENT MODEL: 118-BUS SYSTEM WITH κ = 3
Line Buses Continuous Top-3 Best-3
No. From To Attack (γi) Attack Attack
71 49 51 3.00 3.00 3.00
72 51 52 0.26
74 53 54 3.00 3.00 3.00
82 56 58 2.74 3.00 3.00
Objective (MW) 22.39 22.13 22.13
Buses with
Load Shedding
51, 52, 53 51, 53 51, 53
Buses at
Voltage Boundary
52 52, 53 52, 53
TABLE VI
FIVE MOST EFFECTIVE ATTACKS FROM EXHAUSTIVE ENUMERATION:
118-BUS SYSTEM WITH κ = 3
Lines Selected Power Adjustment (MW)
71 74 82 22.13
71 72 74 19.07
71 74 83 17.21
71 74 184 15.61
71 74 97 13.27
perturbation (γi = 3) on four of them; see Table VII. The Top-
5 and Best-5 attacks each involve the four lines with maximum
impedance increases, but differ in their choice of additional
line. Three buses require load shedding in the Best-5 attack,
compared to two in the Best-3 attack.
Unlike the previous results for κ = 3, which target the
same lines as the voltage disturbance model, the Best-5 attack
identified in the power-adjustment model is slightly different
from the Best-5 attack for the voltage-disturbance model. The
power-adjustment attack targets the region around buses 51,
52, and 53, as before, but also “islands” bus 117 (see Figure 5),
rather than the buses 20, 21, and 22 that are attacked by the
voltage-disturbance model.
2383-Bus System: For the Polish 2383-Bus system, the ESL
procedure (Algorithm 3) identified a set W of 20 vulnerable
lines and, for upper bound γ = 2 on the impedance increase,
a set T of 55 target nodes. (Algorithm 3 required about 270
TABLE VII
POWER-ADJUSTMENT MODEL: 118-BUS SYSTEM WITH κ = 5
Line Buses Continuous Top-5 Best-5
No. From To Attack (γi) Attack Attack
71 49 51 3.00 3.00 3.00
72 51 52 0.36 3.00
74 53 54 3.00 3.00 3.00
75 49 54 0.74
76 49 54 0.81 3.00
81 50 57 0.29
82 56 58 3.00 3.00 3.00
97 64 65 0.80
184 12 117 3.00 3.00 3.00
Objective (MW) 27.16 25.79 26.87
Buses with
Power Adjustment
51, 52, 53, 117 51, 53, 117 52, 53, 117
Buses at
Voltage Boundary
52, 117 52, 53, 117 52, 117
TABLE VIII
POWER-ADJUSTMENT MODEL: 2383-BUS SYSTEM WITH κ = 3
Line Buses From Bilevel Formulation From N − 1
No. From To Cont. (γi) Top-3 Best-3 Top-3 Best-3
5 10 3 2.00
264 140 117 0.02
268 126 118 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
289 135 125 1.98 2.00 2.00 2.00
296 145 128 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Objective (MW) 577.80 577.75 577.75 303.07 577.75
# of Buses with
Power Adjustment
49 27 49
Buses at
Voltage Boundary
145, 146, 1905
145, 146,
230, 1905
145, 146,
1905
seconds of run time on this instance.)
Results for the power-adjustment model on or our third test
case from Table I, for the 2383-Bus system with κ = 3, are
shown in Table VIII. Algorithm 2 returns a four-line attack.
Since the attack on one of these four lines (line 264) is
negligible, we find that the Top-3 and Best-3 solutions both
attack lines 268, 289 and 296, with an active-power load
shedding 577.75 MW, which is negligibly smaller than the
optimal four-line attack. There are 49 buses which need load
shedding for the three-line attack, and three buses have voltage
magnitudes at their lower limits of V = .89 — another sign
of stress on the grid. The solution obtained for this test case
is quite different from the one from the voltage disturbance
model. The lines 5, 404, 405, 467, and 501 which are identified
by the voltage disturbance model (cf. Table IV) also cause
some load shedding when they are attacked, but the effect is
not as serious as the attack on lines 268, 289, and 296.
Since it is computationally intractable to look at all possible
three-line combinations in a 2383-Bus grid, we apply an
“N − 1 enumeration” heuristic to explore the most promising
part of the space of three-line attacks. In this heuristic, each
line i is individually perturbed by setting γi = γ, and we
note which of these perturbations require load shedding. On
this data set, sixteen lines were identified as causing load
shedding. We define a “Top-3(N − 1)” attack to comprise
the three lines that individually cause the most load shedding,
and the “Best-3(N − 1)” attack to be the most disruptive
three-line combination drawn from these sixteen lines. The
resulting attacks are displayed in Table VIII, alongside the
Top-3 attack and Best-3 attack. We see that the Best-3(N−1)
attack is identical to the Top-3 and Best-3 attacks, while the
Top-3(N − 1) attack is inferior.
The optimal attacks for the power-adjustment model in this
third test instance are quite different from those obtained
from the voltage disturbance model, as we see by comparing
Tables IV and VIII. We found, however, that if the lower
bound on voltage magnitude is changed from V = .89 to
V = .87, the optimal attack for the power-adjustment model
is almost identical to the voltage disturbance model. In the
relaxed problem, the buses 145, 146, and 1905 no longer have
their voltage magnitude at the lower bound, while buses 401
and 414 move to the relaxed lower bound. The latter two buses
are among those that suffer significant voltage drop in the
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TABLE IX
POWER-ADJUSTMENT MODEL: 2383-BUS SYSTEM WITH κ = 5
Line Buses From Bilevel Formulation From N − 1
No. From To Cont. (γi) Top-5 Best-5 Top-5 Best-5
5 10 3 2.00
268 126 118 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
269 142 118 2.00 2.00 2.00
289 135 125 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
296 145 128 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
317 142 135 1.54 2.00 2.00
405 437 188 2.00 2.00
467 340 218 2.00
2142 1693 1658 0.46 2.00
Objective (MW) 1109.72 1086.67 1460.25 594.09 597.71
# of Buses with
Power Adjustment
77 78 71 53 53
Buses at
Voltage Boundary
145, 146, 1905 1905
145, 146,
230, 414,
434, 1905
145, 146,
401, 414,
1905
optimal voltage-disturbance attack of Table IV.
Table IX shows results for our fourth test instance from
Table I, an optimal attack on the 2383-Bus system for κ = 5.
The attack determined by our procedure is distributed around
6 lines. The Top-5, Best-5, Top-5(N − 1), and Best-5(N − 1)
attacks are calculated as described above. The Best-5 attack
is significantly more disruptive than the optimal continuous
attack identified by Algorithm 2, probably because of noncon-
cavity in the objective FL. We note however that our algorithm
is much more useful in screening for the most disruptive
collection of lines than is the standard “N − 1” screening
methodology: The Top-5 and Best-5 attacks are much more
damaging than the Top-5(N − 1) and Best-5(N − 1) attacks.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed an attack model for assessing the vul-
nerability of power grids. The attack consists in increasing the
impedance of transmission lines, with the resulting disruption
to the grid measured in two ways. The first technique is to
observe changes in voltage magnitudes at the buses; greater
changes from the nominal values indicate greater disruption.
The second technique is to measure the weighted sum of
adjustments to load and generation that are needed to restore
stable operation of the grid, with the voltage magnitudes
confined to certain prespecified ranges. The two criteria give
rise to optimization problems with different properties. Both
are solved with a combination of known algorithms (such as
Frank-Wolfe) and heuristics that determine promising regions
of the solution space.
In our computational results, we also use our algorithm as a
screening procedure for determining which collections of lines
are likely to cause the most disruptive attacks. By enumerating
combinations of lines from among those identified by our
algorithms, we identify more disruptive attacks than those
produced by alternative screening methods, such as the well
known “N − 1” criterion.
APPENDIX
A. Computing Gradients
We describe here calculation of gradients for the functions
F(γ) defined in Section II, which quantify the grid disruption
arising from an attack modeled by the impedance vector γ.
Both model functions considered here — (4) and (7) — have
the following form:
F(γ) := min
z
f(z) (17a)
subject to ci(z, γ) = 0, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, (17b)
hj(z) ≥ 0, j = 1, 2, . . . , r, (17c)
where the functions f , ci, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, and hj , j =
1, 2, . . . , r are all smooth. (Note that in our models, the
dependence on the upper-level variables γ arises only through
the equality constraints, but our discussion can be extended
without conceptual difficulty to the case in which the objective
and the inequality constraints also depend on γ.)
We outline a technique for calculating the gradient ∇F(γ).
We assume that the minimizing z for the (generally noncon-
vex) problem (17) has been identified and that it is denoted
by z(γ). Moreover, we assume that z(γ) is a nondegenerate
solution of the minimization problem in (17). By this we
mean that the linear independence constraint qualification
holds at the minimizer, that a strict complementarity condition
holds, and that second-order sufficient conditions are satisfied
at z(γ). We show that under these conditions, we can use
the implicit function theorem to define the gradient ∇F(γ)
uniquely. While strong, these conditions are not impractical;
they appear to hold for all values of z(γ) encountered by our
algorithm, and it seems plausible that they would hold for
“almost all” values of γ. The question of existence of ∇F(γ)
becomes much more complicated when these conditions are
not satisfied. When strict complementarity does not hold, for
example, the set of active inequality constraints is on the
verge of changing, an event usually associated with a point
of nonsmoothness of F(γ).
The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for optimality
of z in the problem (17) for a given γ are that there exist
scalars λi, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m and µj , j = 1, 2, . . . , r such that
∇f(z)−
m∑
i=1
λi∇zci(z, γ)−
r∑
j=1
µj∇hj(z) = 0, (18a)
ci(z, γ) = 0, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, (18b)
µj ≥ 0, j ∈ A(z), (18c)
hj(z) = 0, j ∈ A(z), (18d)
µj = 0, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r} \ A(z), (18e)
hj(z) ≥ 0, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r} \ A(z), (18f)
where the active set A(z) is defined as follows:
A(z) := {j = 1, 2, . . . , r : hj(z) = 0}. (19)
We use the following vector notation:
c(z, γ) = [ci(z, γ)]
m
i=1, λ = [λi]
m
i=1,
µA = [µj ]j∈A, hA(z) = [hj(z)]j∈A.
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The linear independence constraint qualification (LICQ) is:
{∇zci(z, γ), i = 1, 2, . . . ,m}∪ {∇hj(z), j ∈ A(z)}
is a linearly independent set.
(20)
The strict complementarity condition is that
µj > 0, for all j ∈ A(z). (21)
Finally, the second-order sufficient conditions are
dTW (z, λ, µ, γ)d > 0 for all d ∈ N(z) with d 6= 0, (22)
where the subspace N(z) is defined as follows:
N(z) :=
d : ∇zci(z, γ)
T d = 0, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m
and
∇hj(z)T d = 0, ∀j ∈ A(z)
 , (23)
and the matrix W (z, λ, µ, γ) is the Hessian of the Lagrangian
function for the problem (17), that is,
W (z, λ, µ, γ) :=
∇2f(z)−
m∑
i=1
λi∇2zzci(z, γ)−
∑
j∈A(z)
µj∇2hj(z). (24)
In the neighborhood of a value of γ at which all the
conditions above are satisfied, we find that (z, λ, µA) is an
implicit function of γ. We find expressions for the derivatives
of (z, λ, µA) with respect to γ by applying the implicit
function theorem (see for example [19, Theorem A.2]) to the
equality conditions in (18), which we can formulate as follows:
∇f(z)−
m∑
i=1
λi∇zci(z, γ)−
∑
j∈A(z)
µj∇hj(z) = 0, (25a)
ci(z, γ) = 0, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, (25b)
hj(z) = 0, j ∈ A(z). (25c)
Note that this system of equations is square, with n + m +
|A| equations and unknowns. Moreover, standard analysis of
optimality conditions shows that its square Jacobian matrix is
nonsingular, under the LICQ (20) and second-order sufficient
(22) conditions. The implicit function theorem now yields the
following:
 ∇z(γ)∇λ(γ)
∇µA(γ)
 = H(z, λ, µ, γ)−1

m∑
i=1
λi∇zγci(z, γ)
−∇γc(z, γ)T
0
 , (26)
where
H(z, λ, µ, γ) =
W (z, λ, µ, γ) −∇zc(z, γ) −∇hA(z)∇zc(z, γ)T 0 0
∇hA(z)T 0 0
 .
We can derive ∇F(z) from ∇z(γ) through the definition (17),
as follows:
∇F(γ) = ∇z(γ)T∇f(z(γ)). (27)
B. Heuristics for Initializing the Power Adjustment Model
1) Determining Safe and Vulnerable Lines: We have noted
that a typical grid contains many “safe” lines, for which large
changes to the impedance do not affect the ability of the grid
to serve demands. We discuss here a filtering approach to
identify the complementary set of “vulnerable” lines, for which
impedance change causes significant disruption of the grid.
(We assume that the number of vulnerable lines is relatively
small; otherwise, the grid has a systemic vulnerability and
would be hard to defend.)
A naive approach for identifying safe and vulnerable lines
is enumeration. For each line i, we set γ = γei (where ei is a
vector of all zeros except for 1 in the ith entry) and evaluate
FL(γ) defined by (8). Vulnerable lines are taken to be those
for which FL(γ) > 0. This enumeration approach is not very
effective, in part because of its cost (it requires solution of |L|
different power flow problems) and because it cannot identify
combinations of lines that are individually “safe” but which
together create a vulnerability in the network. We therefore
propose an alternative heuristic called ESL (for “eliminating
safe lines”).
The motivation of the ESL heuristic is as follow. If a system
operator, instead of an attacker, is asked to increase impedance
on exactly κ lines, then he will choose those κ lines so as
to minimize the disruption to the system. These lines will
not be an attractive choice on the attacker’s side, especially
when increase of impedances on these lines does not lead to
any load shedding, so in general we declare these lines to
be “safe.” On the other hand, the lines not selected by the
operator correspond to those that may cause disruption and
hence are an attractive target for attack. We declare such lines
to be “vulnerable.”
In ESL, following the experiment graphed in Figure 1(b),
we seek the value of κ in (9b) such that a total perturbation
of size κγ can be distributed to lines with little load shedding.
Lines i for which γi ≈ γ are declared to be safe. This process
is repeated until relatively few vulnerable lines remain. The
appropriate value of κ can be found by binary search, by
solving the following modification of the problem in (15),
which depends on a working set W ⊂ L of lines not yet
classified as safe:
HW(κ, γ) = min
x,y,γ
pT y (28a)
subject to FL(x, y; γ) = 0 (28b)
eT γ = κγ (28c)
x ≤ x ≤ x (28d)
0 ≤ y ≤ y (28e)
0 ≤ γi ≤ γ i ∈ W (28f)
γi = 0 i /∈ W. (28g)
The complete procedure is shown in Algorithm 3. We start
by putting all lines L into the working setW , then successively
eliminating fromW those lines i for which the solution of (28)
yields γi within a factor η of the upper bound γ. (We used
η = .9.) The process is repeated until no new “safe” lines
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Algorithm 3 ELIMINATING SAFE LINES (ESL)
Require:
L : Set of all lines;
η ∈ (0, 1): Threshold for screening;
Ensure:
W: a set of vulnerable lines;
S: a set of safe lines;
1: S ← ∅;
2: repeat
3: W ← L\S;
4: Define κ∗ to be the largest value of κ for which HW (κ, γ) < ;
5: S′ ← {i : γi/γ ≥ η, i ∈ W}; I newly determined “safe” lines
6: S ← S ∪ S′;
7: until S′ = ∅
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Fig. 7. Loadability and Load Shedding in PV -curve
are identified. The lines remaining in W are then classified as
“vulnerable.”
2) Target Node Selection: Our approach for selecting “tar-
get” nodes T in Algorithm 2 is based on maximum loadability.
The maximum loadability problem is similar to feasibility
restoration in that it seeks the boundary of the feasible region.
However, rather than starting from an infeasible point (where
the nominal loads cannot be served), it begins from a feasible
grid and increases the loads until demands can no longer be
met. The difference is illustrated in Figure 7, which shows
the PV -curve for a particular demand node. When the grid
is feasible with demand PD, (right curve), the demand can
be increased to P ′′D while retaining feasibility. The difference
P ′′D −PD can be regarded as the maximum loadability at this
node. If the grid is infeasible (left curve) the demand must be
reduced to P ′D before feasibility is recovered.
The formulation for maximum loadability problem can be
obtained by replacing (7f), (7g), and (7h) by the following
constraints:
σ+i = 0 i ∈ G (29a)
σ−i = 0 i ∈ G (29b)
ρi ≤ 0 i ∈ D. (29c)
The first two constraints fix the power generations at their
nominal values, while (29c) allows increase (rather than de-
crease) of demand at the demand buses. When the nominal
loads and generations are feasible, we expect the objective to
be negative at the solution.
To identify the target nodes, we simply set γi = γ for
all vulnerable lines i ∈ W that are identified by the ESL
procedure, Algorithm 3, and solve (7) for this value of γ.
If a node does not require any load shedding under this
V
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Fig. 8. Possible Changes of PV -curve on a Node After Attack.
maximal-perturbation setting, it is unlikely that any attack
on the vulnerable lines will lead to load shedding on this
node. The target nodes are defined to be those for which load
shedding is required, that is, ρi > 0 at the solution of (7). We
denote the set of these nodes by T .
Figure 8 shows target and non-target nodes, and shows
how maximum loadability motivates their classification into
these categories. The top figure shows a non-target node, for
which is it possible to meet the original demand PD even
after the maximum-perturbation attack, though the loadability
is decreased. The bottom figure shows that the demand must
be reduced to P ′D in order for the network to remain feasible.
On this node, there is a chance that an attack on the vulnerable
lines will lead to load shedding. The target nodes are the nodes
affected by the type of attack we are considering, so that even
for a choice of γ that allows the nominal demand on these
loads to be served, the change in maximum loadability may
give us some information on the sensitivity of demand that
can be served to the value of γ. Since the objective in (7) is
of weighted `1 type, we expect the number of target nodes to
be small.
The target nodes T are incorporated into Algorithm 2
by replacing the lower bound (7h) in the formulation (7)
by a negative quantity for the nodes in T , and increasing
these bounds toward zero progressively during the course of
Algorithm 2. Additional details are given in Subsection III-C.
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